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Recently, an enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem was proposed by Rhouma and Belghith. This paper
demonstrates that the enhanced cryptosystem is not secure against the following three diﬀerent classical types of attacks: chosen
plaintext, chosen ciphertext, and known plaintext. In the three attacks, only a pair of (plaintext/ciphertext) was needed to totally
break the cryptosystem.
1. Introduction
Chaos theory has been applied in many diﬀerent research
areas, such as physics, mathematics, engineering, and biology
[1]. The distinct properties of chaos, such as ergodicity,
quasirandomness, sensitivity dependence on initial condi-
tions and system parameters, have granted chaotic dynamics
as a promising alternative for the conventional cryptographic
algorithms. The close relationship between chaos and cryp-
tography makes chaotic encryption a natural candidate
for secure communication and cryptography [2–4]. Chaos-
based cryptography is relied on the complex dynamics of
nonlinear systems or maps which are deterministic but
simple. Therefore, it can provide a fast and secure methods
for data protection, which is crucial for multimedia data
transmission over fast communication channels, such as the
broadband internet communication [5–9].
The chaos-based cryptographic algorithms have sug-
gested some new ways to develop eﬃcient image-encryption
schemes [10–14]. While most of these schemes are based on
low-dimensional chaotic maps, it has been proposed recently
to use high-dimensional chaos namely spatiotemporal chaos,
which is modeled by one-way coupled-map lattices (OCML).
Owing to their hyperchaotic behavior, such systems are
assumed to enhance the cryptosystem security [15].
A 2D CML (coupled map lattice) chaotic model [16]
has a good pseudorandom property, which is regarded as of
high security in data encryption and has been widely used in
secure communication and multimedia encryption. For the
W ×H lattice, the model is defined as:
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f (x) = μx(1− x),
(1)
where i and j are the row and column of the lattice,
respectively, n is the time point, 0 < ε < 1, μ = 4, 0   yi, jn  
1, 0   x   1, and 0   f (x)   1. Here, the periodic boundary
conditions are y
i+H, j
n = yi, jn and yi, j+Wn = yi, jn .
Recently, Lian [17] proposed an eﬃcient image/video
encryption scheme based on the 2D CML in a kind
of spatiotemporal chaos system. However, Rhouma and
Belghith [18] pointed out that Lian’s cryptosystem is not
secure to chosen ciphertext and chosen plaintext attacks
[19, 20] because of the weaknesses in the generation of the
keystream. To eliminate the weaknesses, they also proposed
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an enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosys-
tem with PCBC (propagating cipher-block chaining) mode
[21–23]. Nevertheless, by analyzing the algebraic description
of the enhanced cryptosystem, this study has found some
drawbacks in its structure. Indeed, a chosen plaintext attack,
a chosen ciphertext attack, and known plaintext attack can be
done to decrypt the ciphertext without any knowledge of the
main secret key values. Therefore, this paper points out three
diﬀerent types of attacks to break the enhanced cryptosystem
described in [18]. In the proposed three attacks, only a
pair of (plaintext/ciphertext) was needed to totally break the
cryptosystem.
2. Review of the Enhanced Cryptosystem
This section gives a detailed introduction of the enhanced
spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem proposed
by Rhouma and Belghith [18]. The enhanced cryptosystem
can be divided into 2 phases, that is, encryption and decryp-
tion as shown in Figure 1.
2.1. Encryption Phase. A 2D CML [16] in a kind of spa-
tiotemporal chaos is used in this phase.
(1) Given a master key K = k0, k1, . . . , k127 composed by
128 bits, the lattice is initialized as the same way in
[2, Section 2.2.1].
(2) 64 chaotic sequences (s
i, j
n ) are generated by iterating













with t1 > 0 to improve the initial-value sensitivity.
(3) The produced 64 sequences are quantized into one
integer sequence and 63 binary sequences. The binary












for i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 7, (i, j) /= (0, 0), and n = 0, 1, . . . ,
N − 1, where N is the converted vector length of the
image of size X × Y which will be encrypted.
(4) Set n = 0 and ski, jn = si, jn .
(5) Given the plaintext blocks p
i, j
n , the ciphertext blocks
are generated in a similar way to the following:
c
i, j
n = pi, jn ⊕ ski, jn ⊕ ci, jn−1 (4)
for i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 7 and n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1, where ⊕
is a bitwise XOR operation and c
i, j
−1 = 0.
(6) Given the generated ciphertext at index n, the new








(7) Set n = n + 1 and repeat steps (5) and (6) until the
encryption of all the plaintext blocks.
2.2. Decryption Phase. The decryption process is symmetric
to the encryption process, but replace (4) by the following:
p
i, j
n = ci, jn ⊕ ski, jn ⊕ ci, jn−1 (6)
for i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 7 and n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1, where ci, j−1 = 0.
3. Cryptanalysis of the Enhanced Cryptosystem
3.1. Kerchoﬀs Principle and Four Classical Types of Attacks
Kerchoﬀs Principle. Based on Kerchoﬀs principle [19, 20],
there is a general assumption that the cryptanalyst who
is cryptanalyzing a cryptosystem always knows exactly the
design and working of the cryptosystem and then he/she can
know everything about the cryptosystem except the secret
key.
Four Classical Types of Attacks. There are four classical types
of attacks [18, 20] which are ordered from the hardest types
of attack to the easiest as follows.
(1) Ciphertext only attack (COA): the cryptanalyst pos-
sesses a string of ciphertext C.
(2) Known plaintext attack (KPA): the cryptanalyst pos-
sesses a string of plaintext P and the corresponding
ciphertext C.
(3) Chosen plaintext attack (CPA): the cryptanalyst has
obtained temporary access to the encryptionmachin-
ery. Hence, he/she can choose a plaintext string P and
construct the corresponding ciphertext string C.
(4) Chosen ciphertext attack (CCA): the cryptanalyst has
obtained temporary access to the decryptionmachin-
ery. Hence, he/she can choose a ciphertext string C
and construct the corresponding plaintext string P.
In each of these four attacks, the final objective of the
cryptanalyst is to determine the key that was used. It suﬃces
that one of the attacks is successful to consider an algorithm
insecure.
3.2. PCBC (Propagating Cipher-Block Chaining) Mode. The
enhanced cryptosystem is designed in the PCBC mode
[21–23] of block encryption by using the previous ciphertext
block c
i, j
n−1 and the new keystream sk
i, j
n = si, jn ⊕pi, jn−1 to encrypt
the present plaintext block p
i, j
n at index n, where s
i, j
n is the
present key sequences and p
i, j
n−1 is a previous plaintext block.
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2D CML Keystream: Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · si, jN−1Master key: K = k0k1k2 · · · k127






























































Figure 1: The enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem.
The operation of the algorithm in the PCBC mode is
described in Figure 1, and the encryption and decryption
routines are as follows:
c
i, j




n ⊕ pi, jn−1 ⊕ ci, jn−1
)
, IV = pi, j−1 ⊕ ci, j−1,
p
i, j






⊕ pi, jn−1 ⊕ ci, jn−1, IV = pi, j−1 ⊕ ci, j−1,
(7)
where Esi, jn is the encryption block operation, Dsi, jn is the
decryption block operation, and IV is the initialization
vector. Here IV = pi, j−1 ⊕ ci, j−1 = 0⊕ 0 = 0 because of pi, j−1 = 0
and c
i, j
−1 = 0 from steps (5) and (6) of the encryption phase.
From (7), each encryption operation based on PCBC
mode can be performed as follows:
c
i, j
0 = pi, j0 ⊕ IV⊕ si, j0 , IV = pi, j−1 ⊕ ci, j−1 = 0,
c
i, j
1 = pi, j1 ⊕ pi, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ ci, j0 ,
c
i, j
2 = pi, j2 ⊕ pi, j1 ⊕ si, j2 ⊕ ci, j1
...
(8)
3.3. Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA). This subsection de-
scribes how the keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · of the
encryption algorithm can be recovered using a chosen-
plaintext attack. The attack consists of two steps. First, Si, j
is recovered. Then, the attacker uses Si, j to recover the
plaintext Pi, j from the arbitrary encrypted ciphertext Ci, j .
The flowchart of the chosen-plaintext attack is given by
Figure 2.
3.3.1. Recovering the Keystream Si, j . Suppose that the attacker
has temporary access to the encryption machinery.
(1) The attacker requests a ciphertext Di, j of the chosen
plaintext Mi, j = ⋃n mi, jn = 00000 · · · 000: a plaintext
Mi, j of the same size of the ciphertextDi, j constructed
by the symbols m
i, j
n = 0 for every valid n, i, and j.
(2) The attacker obtains the ciphertext Di, j = ⋃n di, jn .




0 = mi, j0 ⊕ IV⊕ si, j0 , IV = mi, j−1 ⊕ di, j−1 = 0,
d
i, j
1 = mi, j1 ⊕mi, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ di, j0 ,
d
i, j









0 = 0⊕ 0⊕ si, j0 = si, j0 , IV = 0⊕ 0 = 0,
d
i, j
1 = 0⊕ 0⊕ si, j1 ⊕ di, j0 = si, j1 ⊕ di, j0 = si, j1 ⊕ si, j0 ,
d
i, j
2 = 0⊕ 0⊕ si, j2 ⊕ di, j1 = si, j2 ⊕ di, j1 = si, j2 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ si, j0
...
(10)




























































1 = si, j0
d
i, j
1 = si, j0
d
i, j
1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1
d
i, j
1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1
Chosen plaintextMi, j = ∩nmi, jn = 000 · · · with the same size of C
Recover plaintext Pi, j from target ciphertext Ci, j = ∩nci, jn
The recovered plaintext Pi, j = ∩n pi, jn





Request encryption machinery to obtain ciphertext Di, j = ∩ndi, jn
IV = 0
IV = si, j−1 = 0
IV = si, j−1 = 0
d
i, j
N−1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−1
d
i, j
N−2 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−2
d
i, j
N−1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−1
d
i, j
N−2 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−2
Figure 2: Flowchart of chosen-plaintext attack (CPA).
(3) The keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · can be easily
recovered from Di, j by computing
s
i, j
n = di, jn ⊕ di, jn−1, (11)
where d
i, j




0 = di, j0 ⊕ di, j−1 = si, j0 ⊕ 0,
s
i, j
1 = di, j1 ⊕ di, j0 = si, j1 ⊕ si, j0 ⊕ si, j0 ,
s
i, j
2 = di, j2 ⊕ di, j1 = si, j2 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ si, j0
...
(12)







2 · · · for every i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 7, (i, j) /= (0, 0), and n =
0, 1, . . . ,N − 1.
3.3.2. Extracting the Plaintext. Once the attacker knows the
secret keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · he/she can use the above
decryption equation (6) to correctly reveal the plaintext






n = ci, jn ⊕ ski, jn ⊕ ci, jn−1 (13)
for i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 7 and n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1, where ski, jn =
s
i, j
n ⊕ pi, jn−1 and ci, j−1 = 0.
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(a) Plaintext image P (b) Encrypted image C (c) Chosen plaintext imageM
(d) Encrypted image D ofM (e) Recovered image P from the CPA
Figure 3: Simulations results of chosen-plaintext attack (CPA): (a) plaintext image P; (b) encrypted image C; (c) chosen plaintext imageM
and (d) encrypted image D ofM and (e) recovered image P from C by the CPA.
Simulations results of breaking the cryptosystem in
a scenario of CPA is given in Figure 3 which shows a total
recovering of the image (Lena) of size 128× 128.
3.4. Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA). This subsection
describes how the keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · of the
decryption algorithm can be recovered using a chosen-
ciphertext attack. The attack consists of two steps. First,
Si, j is recovered. Then, the attacker uses Si, j to recover the
plaintext Pi, j from the arbitrary encrypted ciphertext Ci, j .
The flowchart of the chosen-ciphertext attack is given by
Figure 4.
3.4.1. Recovering the Keystream Si, j . Suppose that the attacker
has temporary access to the decryption machinery.
(1) The attacker requests a plaintext Mi, j of the cho-
sen ciphertext Di, j = ⋃n di, jn = 00000 · · · 000:
a ciphertext Di, j of the same size of the plaintext Mi, j
constructed by the symbols d
i, j
n = 0 for every valid n,
i and j.
(2) The attacker obtains the plaintextMi, j = ⋃n mi, jn . The
obtained plaintextMi, j is represented as follows:
m
i, j
0 = di, j0 ⊕ IV⊕ si, j0 , IV = mi, j−1 ⊕ di, j−1 = 0,
m
i, j
1 = di, j1 ⊕ di, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕mi, j0 ,
m
i, j









0 = 0⊕ 0⊕ si, j0 = si, j0 , IV = 0⊕ 0 = 0,
m
i, j
1 = 0⊕ 0⊕ si, j1 ⊕mi, j0 = si, j1 ⊕mi, j0 = si, j1 ⊕ si, j0 ,
m
i, j
2 = 0⊕ 0⊕ si, j2 ⊕mi, j1 = si, j2 ⊕mi, j1 = si, j2 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ si, j0
...
(15)
(3) The keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · can be easily
recovered fromMi, j by computing
s
i, j
n = mi, jn ⊕mi, jn−1, (16)




















































1 = si, j0
d
i, j
1 = si, j0
d
i, j
1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1
d
i, j
1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1
d
i, j
1 = 0 d
i, j






Chosen plaintext Di, j = ∩ndi, jn = 000 · · · with the same size of C
Recover plaintext Pi, j from target ciphertext Ci, j = ∩nci, jn
The recovered plaintext Pi, j = ∩n pi, jn





Request decryption machinery to obtain ciphertextMi, j = ∩nmi, jn
IV = 0
IV = si, j−1 = 0
IV = si, j−1 = 0
d
i, j
N−1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−1
d
i, j
N−2 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−2
d
i, j
N−1 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−1
d
i, j
N−2 = si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si, jN−2
Figure 4: Flowchart of chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA).
where m
i, j




0 = mi, j0 ⊕mi, j−1 = si, j0 ⊕ 0,
s
i, j
1 = mi, j1 ⊕mi, j0 = si, j1 ⊕ si, j0 ⊕ si, j0 ,
s
i, j
2 = mi, j2 ⊕mi, j1 = si, j2 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ si, j0 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕ si, j0
...
(17)







2 · · · for every i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 7, (i, j) /= (0, 0), and n =
0, 1, . . . ,N − 1.







2 · · · he/she can correctly reveal the plaintext Pi, j =⋃
n p
i, j
n from an arbitrary encrypted ciphertext Ci, j = ⋃n ci, jn
by using the extracting plaintext phase of Section 3.3.2. Sim-
ulations results of breaking the cryptosystem in a scenario of
CCA is given in Figure 5 which shows a total recovering of
the image (Baboon) of size 128× 128.
3.5. Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA). This subsection de-
scribes how the secret keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · of the
enhanced cryptosystem can be recovered using a known-
plaintext attack. In this case, the attacker dose not choose any
plaintext or ciphertext. Instead, it is assumed that he/she has
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(a) Plaintext image P (b) Encrypted image C (c) Chosen ciphertext image D
(d) Decrypted key imageM of D (e) Recovered image P from C by the CCA
Figure 5: Simulations results of chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA): (a) plaintext image P; (b) encrypted image C; (c) chosen ciphertext image
D; (d) decrypted key imageM of D and (e) recovered image P from C by the CCA.
obtained some plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The attack consists
of two steps. The first step is to calculate the secret keystream
key Si, j . Then, the attacker use Si, j to recover the plaintext Pi, j
from the arbitrary encrypted ciphertext Ci, j . The flowchart
of the known-plaintext attack is given by Figure 6.
3.5.1. Recovering the Keystream Si, j . Suppose that the attacker
knows one plaintext-ciphertext pair Mi, j = ⋃n mi, jn and
Di, j = ⋃n di, jn . Then, he/she can recover the secret keystream
Si, j by performing the following.
(1) The attacker obtains the intermediate values s
i, j
n ⊕di, jn−1
by using (19) with the plaintext-ciphertext pair:
m
i, j
n ⊕ di, jn ⊕mi, jn−1 = mi, jn ⊕mi, jn ⊕ ski, jn ⊕ di, jn−1 ⊕mi, jn−1
= mi, jn ⊕mi, jn ⊕ si, jn ⊕mi, jn−1 ⊕ di, jn−1 ⊕mi, jn−1




n = mi, jn ⊕ ski, jn ⊕ di, jn−1 and ski, jn = si, jn ⊕mi, jn−1.
(2) Let SDi, j = ⋃n si, jn ⊕ di, jn−1 from the result of (19),
then the keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · can be easily
recovered from SDi, j and the ciphertext Di, j = ⋃n di, jn
by computing











2 · · · for one plaintext-ciphertext pair, where i, j =
0, 1, . . . , 7 and n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1.







2 · · · he/she can correctly reveal the plaintext Pi, j =⋃
n p
i, j
n from an arbitrary encrypted ciphertext Ci, j = ⋃n ci, jn
by using the extracting plaintext phase of Section 3.3.2.
Simulation results of breaking the cryptosystem in a scenario
of KPA is given in Figure 7 which shows a total recovering of
the image (baboon) of size 128 × 128 by using the known-
plain-image (jet) of the same size.
3.6. Remarks. In the enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic
image/video cryptosystem, the proposed attacks are eﬀective
because p
i, j
−1 ⊕ ci, j−1 are both zero and so the initial vector
(IV) is also zero. Although these two values are chosen
as nonzero, the proposed attacks still valid because an










0 = mi, j0 ⊕ si, j0 ⊕mi, j−1 ⊕ di, j−1 di, j1 = mi, j1 ⊕ si, j1 ⊕mi, j0 ⊕ di, j0 di, jN−1 = mi, jN−1 ⊕ si, jN−1 ⊕mi, jN−2 ⊕ di, jN−2
m
i, j
N−2 ⊕ di, jN−2
m
i, j


















































Recover plaintext Pi, j from target ciphertext Ci, j = ∩nci, jn
The recovered plaintext Pi, j = ∩n pi, jn
Recover keystream Si, j = ∩nsi, jn = s0s1s2 · · · sN−1 fromMi, j and Di, j
IV = si, j−1 = 0
Figure 6: Flowchart of known-plaintext attack (KPA).
(a) Know plaintext imageM (b) Encrypted image E ofM (c) Caculated key D fromM and E
(d) Arbitrary encrypted image C (e) Recovered image P from C by the KPA
Figure 7: Simulations results of known-plaintext attack (KPA): (a) know plaintext imageM; (b) encrypted image E ofM; (c) calculated key
D fromM and E; (d) arbitrary encrypted image C and (e) recovered image P from C by the KPA.
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p
i, j
−1 ⊕ ci, j−1 = 0. For example, let pi, j−1 = 255(11111111)
and c
i, j
−1 = 255(11111111) then pi, j−1 ⊕ ci, j−1 = 255 ⊕
255 = 11111111 ⊕ 11111111 = 00000000 = 0, let pi, j−1 =
128(10000000) and c
i, j
−1 = 128(10000000) then pi, j−1 ⊕ ci, j−1 =
128⊕ 128 = 10000000⊕ 10000000 = 00000000 = 0.
Therefore, to prevent the proposed attacks in the en-
hanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem,
IV must be known to both the sender and receiver but
be unpredictable by a third party. That is, IV should be
generated randomly each time and should not be reused.
For maximum security, the IV should be protected against
unauthorized changes. This could be done by sending the
IV using ECB (electronic codebook) mode encryption with
master key K .
4. Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated three separate ways to
completely break an enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic
image/video cryptosystem. The paper proved that the secret
keystream Si, j = si, j0 si, j1 si, j2 · · · can be easily revealed using
chosen-plaintext, chosen-ciphertext, and known-plaintext
attacks.
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